Corporate governance
How a company is directed and controlled, and how owners keep managers working for them.
Should managers be trusted to act for the company, or watched?
Corporate governance is the system by which companies are directed and controlled, so that the people who run a company answer to the people it serves.
Lakhs of small shareholders own a listed company, but a few managers run it. The owners cannot watch every decision. Something must keep the managers working for the company rather than for themselves.
In plain wordsCorporate governance is the set of rules and checks that decide who controls a company and how they are held to account.
Exam definitionCorporate governance is the system by which companies are directed and controlled (Cadbury Report, 1992).
A fuller version: corporate governance is the system of rules, practices and processes by which a company is directed and controlled so that stakeholder interests are balanced.
Two theories start from opposite views of the manager.
| Theory | View of the manager | What governance should do |
|---|---|---|
| Agency theory | Managers (agents) may act in their own interest against the shareholders (principals). The conflict is managed through audits and performance incentives. | Monitor and align: independent directors, audits, pay linked to performance, full disclosure |
| Stewardship theory | Managers are trustworthy stewards of the company, not self-interested agents. | Empower: give managers authority and support, and avoid controls that signal distrust |
An illustration. A CEO's bonus depends only on this year's profit. She can lift profit by ₹5 crore by putting off machine maintenance, though the delay will cost ₹15 crore in repairs later. Agency theory predicts that some managers will make that trade. Linking pay to performance over several years, and an audit committee that asks about maintenance, make it less attractive.
The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, first issued in 1999, are international guidelines. They cover shareholder rights, equitable treatment of shareholders, transparency and disclosure, the role of stakeholders, and the responsibilities of the board.
Don't confuse governance with management. Management runs the business day to day. Governance decides who directs the managers, and checks that they serve the company. Also keep the roles straight: shareholders are the principals; managers are the agents.
Where it breaks. Heavy monitoring costs money, and good managers may read it as distrust. Pure stewardship can be naive when pay and power invite abuse. In many Indian companies a promoter family holds control, so the sharper conflict is often between controlling and minority shareholders, not between owners and hired managers.
For exams. Know the Cadbury definition, which party is the principal and which the agent, how agency theory differs from stewardship theory, and the areas the OECD Principles cover.
Go deeper for practitioners
Agency costs. Michael Jensen and William Meckling (1976) named the costs of the owner–manager split. They include the cost of monitoring managers, and the value lost when managers still act for themselves.
In India. The Companies Act, 2013 requires independent directors and audit committees for specified classes of companies. Listed companies must also follow SEBI's Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements (LODR) Regulations, 2015, which replaced Clause 49 of the listing agreement.
A case. In January 2009, the chairman of Satyam Computer Services admitted that the company's accounts had been falsified for years. The board, the auditors and the investors had all relied on figures that were not true. If you sat on a board today, what would you ask for, beyond the audited accounts, to be sure the cash really exists?
1. In agency theory, who is the principal and who is the agent?
Not quite. The answer is “Shareholders are the principals; managers are the agents”. Shareholders own the company and hire managers to run it, so the managers act as their agents. The reversed pairing is the common slip: the owner is always the principal.
2. A CEO's bonus depends only on this year's profit, so she puts off machine maintenance to lift it. Which governance step fits agency theory best?
Not quite. The answer is “Link her pay to performance over several years and have the audit committee review maintenance”. Agency theory says monitor and align: longer-term incentives plus oversight make the short-term trade less attractive. Giving more freedom is the stewardship answer, which assumes the problem away.
3. In many Indian companies a promoter family holds control. Where does the sharpest governance conflict then often lie?
Not quite. The answer is “Between controlling and minority shareholders”. When a family controls the company, the managers usually answer to it, so the risk is that the family serves itself at the cost of small shareholders. The classic owner–manager split matters less there.
- Documented
Agency problem and the tasting of the king's wealth
Kauṭilya assumes the agency problem. Officials who handle funds will find it hard not to take some, he says, and he prescribes audits, rotation of posts and an accounts office. These are the safeguards that agency theory recommends.
Arthaśāstra 2.9 (conduct and embezzlement by officials)
About this text: ArthaśāstraDiscuss
What it addsOfficials who handle funds will find it hard not to take some, and so audits, rotation of posts and an accounts office.
Where they differKauṭilya prescribes safeguards for a state's officials. Agency theory is about managers and shareholders.
- Documented
Stewardship and holding wealth in trust
The Īśa Upaniṣad opens by saying that all of this is pervaded by the divine, and advises enjoying through renunciation, without coveting anyone's wealth. Wealth is held in trust, which is the stewardship stance.
ईशावास्यमिदं सर्वम् … मा गृधः कस्य स्विद्धनम् । īśāvāsyam idaṃ sarvam… mā gṛdhaḥ kasya svid dhanam. Īśa Upaniṣad 1
What it addsAll of this is pervaded by the divine: enjoy through renunciation, without coveting anyone's wealth.
Where they differThe Īśa Upaniṣad opens with a statement about the world. Reading it as wealth held in trust gives the stewardship stance.
- Documented
Stakeholder-first leadership
Kauṭilya's line on the ruler's happiness (chapter 1) is also a governance principle: the head of the institution measures success by the welfare of those it serves.
Arthaśāstra 1.19.34
About this text: ArthaśāstraDiscuss
What it addsThe head of an institution measures success by the welfare of those it serves.
Where they differKauṭilya's line is about a ruler's happiness and his subjects'. The chapter reads it as a governance principle.
Modern: Agency problem
Classical: the tasting of the king's wealth
Modern: Stewardship
Classical: holding wealth in trust
Modern: Stakeholder-first leadership
Classical: —
“In an organisation you know, are managers more like agents or like stewards, and what shows it?”
Still unsure, or see it differently? Ask the community about thisYou’ll sign in first if you haven’t. Your note above stays private.
- Corporate governance is the system by which companies are directed and controlled (Cadbury Report, 1992).
- Shareholders elect the board; the board appoints and oversees managers; reports flow back up.
- Agency theory: managers may act against shareholders, so monitor and align through audits, independent directors and incentives.
- Stewardship theory: managers are trustworthy stewards, so empower them.
- OECD Principles: shareholder rights, equitable treatment, transparency and disclosure, the role of stakeholders, and the board's responsibilities.
Agency: watch. Stewardship: trust.